Does Big Market Delusion Work?

Does Big Market Delusion Work?

One of the difficulties we face when valuing young companies or companies with newย #businessmodelsย is our delusion of the big markets that these firms claim to serve when they arrive at theirย #TAM (Total Addressable Market). As a result, investors/VCs justify high pricing for these companies by pointing to their TAM. We have observed this phenomenon in Food deliveryย toย #ridesharingย andย #EVs.

๐——๐—ผ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐—ด ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜ ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—น๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐˜„๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ธ?
Let us take the instance ofย Zomato, that listed last year with a ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐Ÿต๐Ÿฌ,๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿญ๐Ÿต.๐Ÿฑ๐Ÿณ ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜€ and whose EBIT was -41.6% but traded at ๐Ÿฐ๐Ÿฌ.๐Ÿฐ๐˜… ๐—˜๐—ฉ/๐—ฆ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ฒ๐˜€. Investors justified this high pricing due to the TAM that Zomato was serving and the confidence that Zomato would capture most of the TAM. In effect, Zomato positioned itself in a ๐˜„๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ธ๐—ฒ ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜.

To substantiate how overconfident Zomato was in making this claim, I did a #dcfย valuation of Zomato. I assumed the following:

1)Zomato’s operating margins stabilise at 11% when it matures as a firm.

2)Due to theย #networkeffects, its asset turnover ratio will improve as the firm needs to reinvest less for its high growth.

Then, i varied the revenue growth rate (using Solver in excel) until i arrived at the market cap.

In 2021, at a market cap of 90,219.57 crores, Zomato needed to grow at a ๐Ÿญ๐Ÿฑ๐Ÿฌ% ๐—–๐—”๐—š๐—ฅ ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—บ ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿญ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฒ. Its 10-year CAGR from 2021 to 2031 is 81.03%. The food delivery market in India will grow at a ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿด% ๐—–๐—”๐—š๐—ฅย from 2022 to 2026, implying that ๐—ญ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐—น๐—น ๐—ด๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐˜๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ณ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜, which is absurd.

Fast forward to ๐—๐˜‚๐—น๐˜† ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฎ, when Zomato trades at ๐—ฅ๐˜€.๐Ÿฐ๐Ÿฐ.๐Ÿฎ/๐˜€๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐˜ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐Ÿฏ๐Ÿฐ,๐Ÿฐ๐Ÿด๐Ÿญ ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜€ย – A decline of 162% from its listing. The market has priced Zomato will grow at 66% CAGR (23% correction) for the next ten years, implying that ๐—ญ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐—น๐—น ๐—ณ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป.

๐—™๐—ผ๐—น๐—น๐—ผ๐˜„๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐—บ๐˜† ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜†๐˜€:

1)Young companies ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐˜ƒ๐—ฎ๐—น๐˜‚๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ฏ๐˜† ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ง๐—”๐— . Instead, they must justify how their business models will capture this growth.

2)Startups ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐˜„๐—ป๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ถ๐˜€๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป as well entry of new players and how competitors can spoil their growth projections.

Finally, we need to move away from pricing growth that ignores business models to fundamentals that focus on profitability.

Ultimately, the foundation of business is generating cash, and young companies have to focus on the path to profitability to justify their pricing.